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Abstract
Computer malware and biological pathogens often use sim-
ilar mechanisms of infections. For this reason, it has been
suggested to model malware spread using epidemiological
models developed to characterize the spread of biological
pathogens. However, to date, most work examining the simi-
larities between malware and pathogens using such methods
was based on theoretical analysis and simulation.
Here we extend the classical Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) epidemiological model to describe two of
the most common infection methods used by malware. We
fit the proposed model to malware collected over a period of
one year from a major anti-malware vendor. We show that
by fitting the proposed model it is possible to identify the
method of transmission used by the malware, its rate of in-
fection, and the number of machines which will be infected
unless blocked by anti-virus software. In a large sample of
malware infections, the Spearman correlation between the
number of actual and predicted infected machines is 0.84.
Examining cases where an anti-malware “signature” was
transmitted to susceptible computers by the anti-virus
provider, we show that the time to remove the malware will
be short and independent of the number of infected computers
if fewer than approximately 60% of susceptible computers
have been infected. If more computers were infected, the time
to removal will be approximately 3.2 greater, and will depend
on the fraction of infected computers.
Our results show that the application of epidemiologi-
cal models of infection to malware can provide anti-virus
providers with information on malware spread and its po-
tential damage. We further propose that similarities between
computer malware and biological pathogens, the availability
of data on the former and the dearth of data on the latter, make
malware an extremely useful model for testing interventions
which could later be applied to improve medicine.
1 Introduction
It has been observed that biological pathogens share similari-
ties with computer malware in their methods of infection [3].
These similarities have so far been limited to the application
of models inspired from biology to the modeling of malware.
Here we show that the parallels between the two runs deeper,
and can be used to enrich our knowledge of both.
There are two primary modes of contagion in the biologi-
cal world: One where the pathogen spreads through peer-to-
peer (P2P) infection and the other where the pathogen infects
whenever a susceptible individual visits an infected location.
Most observations on the similarity of malware to bio-
logical pathogens has focused on pathogens and malware
which spreads through P2P infections. Diseases which spread
through P2P contact include, for example, influenza, which
is spread through airborne viruses exhaled by an infected
individual. Similarly, P2P malware include, for example, mal-
ware which is spread through infected email messages such
as the notorious ILOVEYOU [16] and MyDoom [11] worms.
Malware becomes activated when the email is opened by a
user, which then scans the user’s address book and sends itself
to all the addresses therein. Another example is the recent
WannaCry [17] ransomware, which used the EternalBlue [32]
exploit to propagate from an infected machine.
Many food-borne biological pathogens spread when a cen-
tral food processing facility is contaminated. In such cases,
infection occurs only in those foods which passed through the
facility. The analogous malware is one which infects comput-
ers which visit a contaminated website such as the Zeus [15]
malware, the JavaScript based drive-by cryptocurrency miner
such as Trojan:JS/Miner.A [13] or the Flashback [12] trojan,
which downloads the malicious payload through the browser.
We refer to this form of spreading as Central Source (CS).
There are several additional apparent and less apparent sim-
ilarities between computer malware and biological pathogens
which lend the two to be modeled through similar models.
First, the size of populations exposed to biological epi-
demics, which range from several hundreds of individuals to
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(potentially) a few billions of people or animals, is not dissim-
ilar from the number of computers which can be potentially
exposed to malware. Recent estimates [7] are that 8.4 billion
computers and computing devices are currently connected to
the internet and are thus potentially susceptible to a malware
infection.
Though some malware, such as the notorious NotPetya1, is
targeted at a limited number of computers, e.g., those without
the patch for the EternalBlue [32] exploit, other malware in-
fect many hundreds of millions of machines. An example of
such malware is Kovter [14]. This is in parallel to biological
pathogens, some of which can only infect a small susceptible
population where others can infect most people in a popula-
tion. The former usually appear when human behavior makes
people susceptible to infection, and when that behavior is
limited to a small group of people. For example, Kuru [9]
was spread through cannibalism which was limited to a small
group of people in Papua New Guinea. The latter are more
common and include seasonal influenza, which can infect
most people in a population [29].
Another similarity between biological pathogens and com-
puter malware is the use of vaccines to combat their spread.
Vaccines are used to inoculate a population of susceptible
people or animals in order to prevent the spread of a disease
within the population. Similarly, computers usually run an
anti-virus software which uses signatures of malware in or-
der to identify potential malware files2. These signatures are
sent from a central authority or are accessed by the computers
online using a cloud protection architecture. Once a signa-
ture is prepared by a security analyst and sent to computers,
these computers are, with high probability, immune from the
malware.
Note that vaccines to counter a pathogen are usually admin-
istered before an infection begins circulating in a population.
Once a person is infected, vaccines are usually of limited
efficacy (though exceptions, such as rabies, exist). In contrast,
malware signatures are usually developed only after a mal-
ware is circulating in a population of computers. Computers
are immune to a malware installing itself once a signature is
available. Moreover, periodic scans by anti-virus software can
detect and remove malware which has already been installed
on a computer.
These similarities suggest that similar tools can be used
to model both pathogens and malware. Here we show that
population-level modeling tools developed for pathogens can
be applied to malware and that the rate of spread of malware
and biological pathogens is similar.
The most commonly used epidemiological model for in-
fectious disease is the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR)
model [19]. This model describes the number of suscepti-
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_cyberattacks_on_
Ukraine
2Here we refer to software used to block malware as either anti-virus or
anti-malware software interchangeably.
ble (S), infected (I), and recovered (R) individuals over time
in a population, when infected by a pathogen. Individuals
move from the susceptible population to the infected when
the disease has spread to them, and from the infected to the
recovered once they manage to overcome the infection. The
SIR model is represented by a system of three ordinary dif-
ferential equations. Variations in this model include the SIS
model, where people who recover can be infected again, and
are therefore moved directly to the susceptible population
upon recovery.
The advantage of applying epidemiological modeling tools
to malware is that epidemiological models have been devel-
oped for over a century and have been extensively tested.
Perhaps even more importantly, the analogy between mal-
ware and pathogens enables the development of strategies
for handling biological pathogens which can be informed by
those of malware for several reasons:
First, microscopic data for biological pathogen spread in
a population is rarely available and when it is, it necessitates
complex collection efforts and is limited in scale. This is in
contrast with malware, where these data are readily available
to anti-virus providers. For example, while there are only
relatively few examples of vaccinations, there are hundreds
of thousands of signatures, each for a specific malware. Thus,
if carefully evaluated, the spread of malware vis-à-vis the
development of signatures can be used to model the effects of
vaccines during an epidemic or a pandemic from a biological
pathogen.
Additionally, the impact of vaccination to biological
pathogens cannot be observed directly. Inoculated individ-
ual may resists the virus, but that is rarely known even by the
individual. However, with computer malware, an anti-virus
client will often report to the provider that it encountered and
blocked a malicious file.
We claim that the similarity among the two suggests that
strategies for containment which are developed and tested
on malware can then be applied to pathogens. Essentially,
malware provides a model for biological pathogens which
can be observed in the wild.
Thus, we show that epidemiological models can assist in
identifying the mode of transmission of malware and to esti-
mate the size of the susceptible population. Conversely, strate-
gies for handling of malware can inform the handling of
pathogens: We show how the introduction of signatures af-
fects the spread of malware in a population of susceptible
computers, and demonstrate the importance of early vaccina-
tion to prevent wide-spread infection.
2 Related work
Malware describes different types of software, including
viruses and worms, that have malicious or fraudulent in-
tent [10]. Some estimates are that over 350,000 new malware
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and potentially unwanted application samples appear each
day [1, 20].
As noted above, the idea of modeling malware spread us-
ing epidemiological models has been proposed in the past.
Kephart and White [18] applied an SIS model to a malware
epidemic. In their work, the topology of the network in which
the malware spreads was simulated using random graphs.
They focused on computer viruses spreading through a P2P
spreading mechanism. Note that the usage of random graphs,
suitable for the pre-Internet era, is inaccurate for modern net-
work topology known to be scale-free.
Wang et al. [30] extended this analysis of virus spread to ad-
ditional types of simulated networks topologies (hierarchical
and clustered) and analyzed the effect of immunization on the
scale of infection. The spreading mechanism of the viruses
was assumed to be random (over the network topology). The
analysis showed that in those types of networks, vaccination
of selected nodes can help in preventing the spread of viruses,
motivating further research into the selection of nodes to im-
mune.
Focusing on email viruses (which spread through a P2P
mechanism), Gareto et al. [6] modeled the spread of these
viruses using a stochastic model based on Markov Chains
and simulated their propagation in a simple model of a small-
world graph [31].
Berger et al. [3] focused on SIS models and provided theo-
retical support to the importance of vaccination against mal-
ware spread, rigorously showing that in a scale-free graph any
virus with a positive rate of P2P spread has a positive chance
of becoming an epidemic.
All the above work used simulation in lieu of actual data
on malware epidemics and network topology. Taking one
step closer to real-world networks, Hu et al. [10] used data
consisting of the location of WiFi routers to reconstruct sev-
eral router networks. Malware spread in these networks was
modeled using a P2P stochastic process taking into account
the router’s security settings. This work, by its nature, did
not consider CS spreading mechanism, and immunization of
infected routers is not included in their analysis.
Most past works assumes a homogeneous population,
where the rate of infection is the same for all machines. In
contrast, Feng et al. [5] used an SIR model with an infection
rate which changes over time. This rate was a function of
the number of infected machines. Heterogeneous infection
rates in SIS models are also used in [27]. Here, instead of a
single random-variable for any two nodes, they use a differ-
ent one to model a separate infection rate for any two nodes.
Their theoretical findings are validated on both synthetic and
real network architectures, but without real-world malware
propagation patterns.
Another SIR model which supports a more fine-grained
analysis is presented in Liu et al. [22], where the variables con-
trolling malware propagation and immunization are heteroge-
neous. Each computer is either weakly-protected or strongly-
protected. Weakly-protected computers are more likely to
be infected with malware and less likely to receive a vacci-
nation after they are infected than their strongly-protected
counterparts. This work is similar to ours in that it used het-
erogeneous infection rates. However, whereas the infection
rates in this work varied by the security level of a computer,
ours depends on the malware spreading mechanism(s). A
combination of the two approaches is an interesting direction
for future research.
Novel methods to disseminate the vaccine were examined
in Goldenberg et al. [8], who analyzed simulations of malware
in email networks and ways to propagate vaccines such that
they will reach more susceptible machines sooner.
Thus, our work adds several novel advances to the state of
the art. First, we use a heterogeneous infection rate depending
on the method of infection. Second, we fit our models to
real-world data of malware propagation. Our models provide
pertinent, actionable information to anti-malware vendors.
Finally, we examine the effect of vaccines on malware spread
in a real-world setting.
3 Models of malware spread
As noted above, there are two primary models of infection
used by biological pathogens and by computer malware: P2P
and CS. These modes of infection can be used interchangeably
by the same malware, if one mode of infection is blocked
or if it exploits different vulnerabilities to spread. Thus, we
propose a generalization of the SIR model [19] for modeling
the spread of an infectious disease in a susceptible population
through both models of infection.
The classic SIR model is represented by a system of ordi-
nary differential equations for the number of susceptible (S),
infected (I), and recovered (R) individuals. It accounts for a
single virus or malware, and assumes peer to peer infection,
that is, equal probability of being infected by any individuals
regardless of his position. Formally, mean field interaction
between machines can be expressed as:
dS
dt
=−βSI, dI
dt
= βSI− γI, dR
dt
= γI, (1)
where β > 0 is the infection rate and γ > 0 is the recovery
rate.
The model in Eq.(1), can be generalized to account for
multiple malware strains and spreading mechanisms. To this
end we transform to a multidimensional representation in
which S, I, R, β, and γ are tensors (Eq.(2). We further allow the
two modes of infection to occur simultaneously (albeit with
different infection rates) by dividing the relevant terms into
two and allowing two infection rates (βp2p,βCS). A similar
model, and its reduction to account for multiple biological
viruses in one population, is presented by Levy et al. [21]. In
the general case the dynamics is represented by the following
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system of ordinary differential equations:
dS
dt
=−Iβᵀp2pS−βᵀcsS
dI
dt
= Sβᵀp2pI+Sβ
ᵀ
cs− γᵀI
dR
dt
= γᵀI
(2)
where boldface represents a tensor, and βp2p and βcs are
probability tensors representing the probability to be infected
from a peer machine or from a central source respectively.
The main difference between the mode of propagation of
P2P and that of CS (quantified in the second equation above)
is in the factors determining the number of infected machines
(or individuals) in the next time step. In P2P propagation this
is dependent both on the number of susceptible machines and
the number of infected machines at the current time, whereas
in CS propagation it is only predicated on the number of
currently susceptible machines.
In this paper we focus on a special dynamic evolution case,
where a system is infected with multiple malware strains that
do not mutate, and where each malware propagates and infects
additional machines either through peer-to-peer interactions
(for example, through infected email messages) or from a
central source (e.g., where visiting a specific website causes
a malware to be downloaded to the computer). Hence, all
tensors in Eq.(2) are diagonal and we allow either βp2p or βcs
to be non-zero.
We assume that, in contrast to biological viruses, malware
will eradicated from a machine only when an appropriate se-
curity patch will be installed, and once it is installed recovery
is immediate. This behaviour is similar to SIS-like dynamics,
which characterize malware, see Berger et. al. [3].
The infected population of computers is important for two
reasons. First, it represents the population which might suffer
from the harms associated with the malware (for example, it
will devote CPU cycles to mine bitcoin when the machine’s
owner did not intend to do so). In P2P propagation it can also
infect other machines. An infected machine will continue to
infect others either until it receives the relevant signature or if
it is disconnected from the network or turned off. For these
reasons, γ is affected by multiple factors, and should not be
set to zero even if a signature is not available.
In general, the model in Eq.(2) can account for mutations
as well as hybrid infection vectors. These are modeled by
removing the restriction on all tensors. In such cases, non-
diagonal elements can represent mutations. A combination of
non-zero βp2p and βcs can represent hybrid propagation and
infection vectors of malware.
4 Methods
Henceforth we use the following notation: The time-series
representing the number of machines first infected with a
given malware on day t is denoted by xt , where t = 0 is the
first day that this malware appeared on any machine. The
number of infected machines at day t according to the models
is denoted by xMt .
4.1 Data
Our dataset contains telemetry reports from Microsoft De-
fender Anti-Virus collected between April 1st, 2017 to April
1st, 2018. These reports are produced by end-point machines
when a file scan is performed by the anti-virus software. Each
telemetry report contains metadata regarding the file, includ-
ing a unique identifier which is computed based on the file’s
content (as identified by the SHA-1 hash of the file), as well
as the time of the scan, a unique identifier of the machine,
the result of the scan performed and the time that the file first
appeared on the machine.
We note that it is possible for a clean file to be scanned
(for instance if downloaded from the web, or if the file is a
portable-executable file) and the results of this scan to be in
the reported data.
Our analysis contains all the report of files which were
classified as malware sometime during the time frame used.
In our analysis we focused on files which were seen on at
least 200 machines.
We modelled the time series of each malware through the
number of machines per day on which the malware was first
seen on (regardless of it being detected as malware).
Using these data, we found the first time that each malware
was marked as such, indicating that an appropriate signature
was developed for it and that this signature was available to
the anti-virus software on machines. We refer to this time as
the Vaccination Time.
4.2 Fitting models to data
The P2P model and the CS model are each parametrized by
three parameters: The number of individuals infected at time
zero (I(0)); the rate of recovery (γ); and the Basic Reproduc-
tion Number (R0), which is equal to β/γ (either βp2p or βcs,
depending on the model). Following [21], we generated a
dictionary of model functions by creating instantiations of
the number of infected individuals over time for each valid
solution of the model equations in a 10-point grid with the
parameter values shown in Table 1.
As noted above, in this work we focus on the case where
malware strains do not mutate, and each infects other ma-
chines either through P2P interactions or from a central source.
Thus, two models, each describing a different mode of propa-
gation, are fit to every malware.
4
The models are fit to the time series of a malware (the num-
ber of infected machines over time) by finding the dictionary
function with the highest cross-correlation with the malware
time series. The cross-correlation (c(τ)) is defined [28] as:
c(τ) =
TMax
∑
t=TMin
d(t−τ)xt
where τ ∈ [0,1, · · · ,25] to reduce the effect of noise, dt is
the dictionary function and xt is the time series of the malware,
which is assumed to have values between TMin and TMax.
The use of cross-correlation allows a phase difference (time
shift) between dictionary time series and the malware time
series. The dictionary function from each of the propagation
methods (CS and P2P) which reached the highest correlation
at any delay is chosen.
After fitting each of the models, the model (CS or P2P) with
the highest cross-correlation is chosen as the model which
best describes the malware. The output of this stage is xMt .
It is assumed that one of the models will better fit a given
malware because it describes its actual mode of propagation.
To measure the accuracy of this assumption, 30 malware in-
stances were labeled by a security expert as to their method of
propagation. This was compared to the method of propagation
inferred by the best fitting model.
4.3 Predicting the size of the susceptible
population
The susceptible population was estimated through the fol-
lowing process: First, the P2P and CS models were fit using
only the first 30 days since a malware first appeared. The best
fitting model was chosen.
Then, xt was scaled by fitting a first-order polynomial from
it to xMt for t = 0, ...,30. Thus, xi ≈ α ·xMt +β. The model was
fit to minimize the sum-of-squares of the residual.
The total number of susceptible individuals was computed
as the cumulative sum of the of xMt , transformed using the
linear model: α ·∑∞t=0 xMt +β.
The model was validated by examining malware instances
where an anti-virus signature was applied to the malware at
least 6 months after the peak of the infection and its effect was
therefore small. For those we compared the total number of
machines that were infected by the malware with the predicted
number of susceptible machines.
4.4 Measuring the effect of vaccination
Once a malware is identified, an anti-virus “signature” is
developed, which typifies the malware. This signature acts
as a vaccine, enabling computers to identify and quarantine
the malware. These signatures are either available online, for
anti-virus software on client machines to access them, or are
transmitted to these clients for offline use.
In this section we seek to measure the correlation between
the time that the vaccine is made available vis-à-vis the spread
of the malware, and the time it takes for the malware to stop
spreading.
Our measure of malware spread is the time until 99% of
all machines reporting to have been infected by the malware
are infected. We refer to this as the Time to Termination,
denoted by TTerm. We modeled TTerm as a function of the
following attributes:
1. The number of estimated susceptible machines (as cal-
culated in Section 4.3).
2. The number of infected machines until the time that the
vaccine is provided.
3. The model parameter β of the best-fitting model (either
βp2p or βcs).
4. The fit of the models (P2P and CS): The maximal cross-
correlation (see 4.2) of each model.
Model fits and the estimates for the number of infected
machines were computed using the first 30 days of data from
the first time that the malware was observed on any machine
or, if the vaccine was disseminated before, using the data until
the date of vaccine dissemination.
The ability of the above attributes to explain TTerm was eval-
uated in two ways: First, we trained a regression tree model
and evaluated its performance using 10-fold cross validation.
Second, we created a Cox proportional hazard model. In both
cases the predicted size of the susceptible population and
the number of infected machines at vaccination time were
log-transformed because of their skewed distribution.
5 Results
5.1 Fitting models to data
As noted in Section 4.2, 30 files were analyzed by a security
analyst as to their method of propagation. The method cited
by the analyst (CS or P2P) was compared to that inferred from
the model with the better fit to the data.
Among the 30 files examined, the method of 12 could not
be deduced. The method of propagation of the remaining
18 was compared to the method of propagation inferred by
the best fitting model (P2P or CS). The Kappa statistic [24]
between the two was 0.48, indicating a medium-level agree-
ment between the method of propagation as inferred from
the temporal profile of the malware and the actual method
of propagation. All cases of P2P-propagating malware were
correctly identified, while almost half (5 of 12) CS malware
were not.
Interestingly, among the 5 CS malware that were identified
as P2P, the transmission mechanism of two malware files
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Parameter Range Spacing
The number of individuals infected at time zero (I(0)) (100,107) Logarithmic
Basic reproduction number (R0) (0.7,5) Linear
Rate of recovery (γ) 10−6,10−2 Logarithmic
Table 1: Dictionary parameters
was predominantly CS, but they also had a P2P transmission
mechanism, and hence could be considered a hybrid. If these
two malware are excluded, the Kappa rises to 0.64. This
finding motivates further research on the option of a hybrid
infection mechanism.
5.2 Predicting the susceptible population
Figure 1 shows the plot of the predicted number of susceptible
machines and their actual number, for 130 cases where the
anti-virus was not applied to the malware, or was applied after
most machines were infected.
Of the 130 files, 31 were matched to a P2P model and 99 to
a CS model. The average correlation between the best fitting
instantiation of the SIR model and the data was 0.30. The
average fit to the CS model was, on average, better (0.35),
compared to the fit of the P2P model (0.16).
As Figure 1 shows, there is strong correlation between the
predicted and actual number of infected machines (Spearman
ρ= 0.84, P< 10−10).
Note that the estimated number of machines is often higher
than the actual number for P2P infections. This is likely due
to the (typically) lower slope of the number of infected in-
dividuals at the beginning of the epidemic in P2P models,
which makes the curve fitting of the linear model (Section
4.3) noisier.
5.3 Measuring the effect of vaccination
The effect of the introduction of a vaccine was measured on
188 malware instances.
Figure 2 shows the time to eradication as a function of the
estimated fraction of susceptible machines that were infected
at the time of vaccination. In the figure, malware instances
are divided to two populations according to the fraction of in-
fected machines at the time of vaccination. For the population
with a fraction smaller than 0.6 the average time to eradica-
tion is 51 days. A rank regression model shows no correlation
between the fraction of susceptible infected machines and the
time to eradication (R2 = 0.01, P= 0.64). This is in opposi-
tion to the population where the fraction of infection is greater
than 0.6. For this population the average time to eradication
is 164 days, and a rank regression model achieves R2 = 0.14
(P= 0.07). Thus, the time to eradication is approximately 3.2
times greater when the fraction of infection is greater than
0.6.
Figure 1: The predicted number of infected machines versus
the actual number of infected machines. The axes are both
log-scaled. The dotted line shows equal values of predicted
and actual machines.
Figure 2: Time to eradication as a function of the estimated
fraction of susceptible machines that were infected at the time
of vaccination. Blue dots denote malware with an estimated
fraction smaller than 0.6 whereas orange dots have a fraction
greater than 0.6. Lines denote the fit of a linear model.
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Parameter Hazard (S.E.) p-value
P2P Model fit 4.36 (0.96) N.S.
CS Model fit 13.69 (0.56) 2.6 ·10−6
Predicted susceptible population 1.08 (0.10) N.S.
Number of infected machines at vaccination time 0.67 (0.14) 0.005
Model parameter 0.00 (17.01) N.S.
Table 2: Hazard model coefficients of the Time to Termination (TTot). N.S. refers to a parameter which is not statistically
significantly associated with the Time to Termination.
Thus, when an infection has not been able to infect a signifi-
cant part of the susceptible population, the time to eradication
is not affected by the phase of infection where vaccination was
administered and the time to eradication is short. However, if
much of the susceptible population is infected, time to erad-
ication is dependent on when the vaccine was administered
and, on average, eradication will take much longer.
The regression tree model reached a Spreaman correlation
of ρ = 0.35 (p = 6 · 10−7). This indicates that the Time to
Termination can be predicted with a significant accuracy.
Attribute importance was estimated using Shapley Addi-
tive Explanations [23]. The most important attributes were
CS model fit and the number of infected machines at vaccina-
tion time. We posit that these two were the most influential
variables because most malware were CS, and because in
CS infections the number of infected machines in the next
time step is solely determined by the number of infected ma-
chines in the current time step. Hence, these two parameters
interact to determine the Time to Termination. The fit of the
P2P model was the 3rd most important attribute, and was
negatively correlated with Time to Termination.
The hazard model is shown in Table 2. It is noted that a
high hazard rate means that malware are more likely to be
terminated. The hazard model found two statistically signif-
icant variables: The quality of fit to the CS model and the
number of infected individuals at vaccination time. The first
shows that a good CS model fit increases the chances that the
vaccination will terminate the infection, possibly indicating
that CS malware are easier to terminate using vaccines. The
number of infected machines at vaccination time has a hazard
ratio of 0.67, indicating that it is harder to stop an infection if
more machines are already infected.
6 Discussion
Spreading mechanisms of computer malware and of biolog-
ical pathogens share significant underlying similarities. In
this paper we discuss two spreading mechanisms, Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) and Central Source (CS), which are common in
both malware and biological pathogens. Our approach starts
with a model that can describe the number of infected ma-
chines or individuals when a pathogen or malware uses each
of the spreading mechanisms. We also offer a hybrid model
to describe malware types that use both mechanisms simulta-
neously (though we do not demonstrate its application in this
paper).
Our findings demonstrate that it is possible to infer the
spreading mechanism of a malware from the temporal pro-
file of the model fit to it. This fit also provides an estimate
of the susceptible population soon after the malware begins
spreading (Figure 1).
Our models suggest that vaccines (malware signatures)
are most effective for reducing the spread of CS malware.
Moreover, once a malware is installed on a significant frac-
tion of potentially infected machines, it is much more diffi-
cult to remove it (see Figure 2). Interestingly, this behavior
demonstrates a phase transition whereby the time to remove a
malware is independent of the percentage of susceptible ma-
chines infected until around 60% of potential. Such behavior
has been observed in simulations of biological infections [33].
The use of a model applied to observed infection dynamics
enables us to estimate the spreading mechanism of the mal-
ware and from it, hidden variables typifying the malware and
its environment. These include the probability of infection
(β) and the number of potentially vulnerable machines – the
susceptible population. These two parameters are important
information for an anti-virus vendor, as they allow an assess-
ment of the speed with which the vendor needs to respond
to a new threat: The probability of infection indicates how
quickly a malware will spread while the number of suscepti-
ble machines shows how many machines will be infected if
no action is taken.
Thus, fitting the epidemiological model can help anti-virus
vendors to achieve two important goals. First, the model
which obtains the best fit hints to the way that it spreads,
suggesting ways to counter it. Second, the parameters of the
model can help prioritize the response to malware because it
informs of its reach and speed of propagation. We note that
for prioritization, an important third factor, the harm done by
each malware, should be taken into account. Our models do
not provide such assessment.
The behavioural likeness of viruses of the cyber domain
and those of the biological nature can help in understanding
of various processes in one domain from observations in the
other. An example for such cross domain postulation is the
effect of vaccination, which is easily tracked in the cyber
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domain and hard to follow in the biological one. Our finding
that for malware, the timing and nature of spreading relative
to the timing of vaccination influences the effectiveness of
vaccination, can be extrapolated to biology. Our finding that
there is a threshold effect, whereby the time to eradication
is independent until approximately 60% of the susceptible
population is infected means that public health authorities
should act quickly to suppress an infection, especially if it is
estimated that the infection is close to the critical threshold.
Future work will examine other parallels between mal-
ware and biological pathogens, and the knowledge that can be
gleaned about one from observing the other. For example, the
effect of population heterogeneity and of geography and mo-
bility are known to affect the pattern of spread of biological
pathogens [2, 25, 26]. The concept of geographical proximity
(both physical and logical) also exists in computer networks
and its effect on malware spreading has begun to be exam-
ined [4,10]. Future work will determine if the epidemiological
analogy is indeed useful to facilitate monitoring and blocking
of malware which exploits proximity-related weaknesses.
Another avenue for future investigation will determine the
limits of the analogy. Thus, just as it is important to determine
when knowledge on malware can inform health authorities
and vice versa, it is crucial to understand when it does not.
We are examining areas where the proposed analogies break.
Nevertheless, we believe that the analogies between mal-
ware and pathogens are useful and can help both health au-
thorities and anti-virus providers more insights to combating
these threats.
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Lev
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